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Low Complexity Secure Code (LCSC) Design for
Big Data in Cloud Storage Systems
Mohsen Karimzadeh Kiskani†, Hamid R. Sadjadpour† , Mohammad Reza Rahimi‡ and Fred Etemadieh‡
Abstract—In the era of big data, reducing the computational
complexity of servers in data centers will be an important goal.
We propose Low Complexity Secure Codes (LCSCs) that are
specifically designed to provide information theoretic security
in cloud distributed storage systems. Unlike traditional coding
schemes that are designed for error correction capabilities, these
codes are only designed to provide security with low decoding
complexity. These sparse codes are able to provide (asymptotic)
perfect secrecy similar to Shannon cipher. The simultaneous
promise of low decoding complexity and perfect secrecy make
these codes very desirable for cloud storage systems with large
amount of data. The design is particularly suitable for large size
archival data such as movies and pictures. The complexity of
these codes are compared with traditional encryption techniques.
Index Terms—Distributed Cloud Storage Systems, Information
Theoretic Security, Big Data
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, it is becoming increasingly inefficient
to apply traditional cryptographical algorithms to securely
store data. The traditional methods of providing security
require significant computational power and are not well
optimized for big data applications.
For instance, Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
protocol which is the backbone of internet security uses the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol stack in Transmission
Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) for secure and
private data transfer. TLS is a protocol suite that uses a myriad
of other protocols to guarantee security. Many of these sub-
protocols consume a lot of CPU power and are complex
processes which are not optimized for big data applications.
For instance, TLS uses public-key cryptography paradigms
to exchange the keys between the communicating parties
through the TLS handshake protocol. One of the well-known
key-exchange algorithms that is used in TLS handshaking
protocol is the RSA algorithm. With the typical modular expo-
nentiation algorithms used to implement the RSA algorithm,
public-key operations take quadratic computations, private-key
operations take cubic computations and key generation takes
quartic computations with respect to the number of bits in
the modulus. After the key-exchange, TLS uses TLS record
protocol and algorithms like Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), which is the current adopted algorithm by the U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the
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encryption of electronic data, to form block ciphers for fixed
block sizes of 128 bits. Each 128 bits of data therefore needs
to undergo AES calculations to be transformed to ciphertexts.
Albeit all the effort to enhance the performance of such
algorithms, todays secure cryptographic protocols are not well
suited in big data applications as they need to perform a
significant number of computations. Such unnecessary CPU
processing time and power renders cloud service providers
to spend significant resources to maintain their secure cloud
services.
On the other hand, most of current cryptographic algorithms
are based on computational security paradigms. In compu-
tational security, it is inherently assumed that the man-in-
the-middle is unable to perform complex computations and
it does not have infinite processing time for cryptanalysis.
Such algorithms are vulnerable to attacks in time and they
may be broken by novel deciphering algorithms. For instance,
Data Encryption Standard (DES) which, prior to AES, was the
official Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in the
U.S. is no longer considered to be secure.
With a focus on reducing the decryption complexity, we
propose a completely new security paradigm for archival data
in distributed cloud systems. Reduced decryption complexity
ensures that a significant amount of redundant processing
power for security purposes is avoided. This saves significant
amount of resources for cloud service providers. Further, we
prove that the proposed solution is information theoretically
secure as opposed to computationally secure. Information
theoretic secrecy guarantees that our solution is secure re-
gardless of the computational power of the adversary and the
cryptanalysis time.
Our method is based on random sparse codes that are specif-
ically designed for security purposes. The sparsity of these
codes allows the decryption which is done on the clouds to be
a low complexity operation. Further, the specific design of our
codes allows us to achieve security using the randomness of
the encryption operations. Our method is optimized to work
with large number of files that need to be archived. We prove
that larger number of files will result in more secure solutions.
Our method asymptotically achieves perfect secrecy posed by
Shannon in [1]. In cases when the number of files is not
very large, our method is still capable of achieving a level
of obfuscation that is desirable for many applications such as
storing private images and videos.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
is dedicated to the related works in security of distributed
storage systems and also the works on utilizing codes for
security purposes. The assumptions and problem formulation
2are described in section III. In section IV we will prove that at
least one dense encoding scheme exists that results in a secure
solution and in section V we will examine the security of our
approach. The complexity analysis and simulation results are
provided in section VI and the paper is concluded in section
VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Secure transmission of data is usually implemented at higher
layers of network. Recently, there is a significant interest
in studying physical layer security. Physical layer security
assumes that all receivers, both legitimate and eavesdropper,
possess the same complete knowledge of the transmission
technique. The main idea is based on the original idea that
there is a transmitter (Alice) who wants to transmit data to a
legitimate receiver (Bob) while an eavesdropper (Eve) tries to
listen to this communication and obtain the information. In this
scenario, Alice can adopt any kind of encoding, modulation
or even randomization before transmission but both Bob and
Eve are aware of the transmission technique being used by
Alice. Therefore, if there is no noise or channel impairment,
an eavesdropper can perfectly decode the message. Wyner in
1975 [2] proved that in case of noisy wiretap channels, Alice
can encode the message so that it reveals no information to
the Eve. An important parameter in wiretap channel is the
secrecy capacity. Secrecy capacity is defined as the highest
transmission rate that data can be transmitted in a wiretap
channel such that Eve cannot decode any information and its
probability of error stays close to 0.5.
After the Wyner paper, many researchers started to study
the wiretap channel capacity for different scenarios. Also
achieving that capacity was another research objective in many
publications. Many researchers [3]–[10] studied the use of
error correcting codes for wiretap channels and other types
of networks.
In this paper, we are deviating from this common approach
and investigating a completely different problem. Suppose
Alice has some data that wants to store in a cloud storage
system. However, Alice does not want the cloud storage
system to be able to access this data. Therefore, if this data
is accessed by Eve, no information can be obtained from the
stored data. Further, when this information that is stored by
Alice in the cloud is wiretapped by Eve during transmission,
no useful information can be obtained by her. Note that we also
assume that no encryption technique is used and only coding
schemes are utilized to protect the data. There are some prior
work that attempted to use existing coding schemes to address
this issue.
Some papers use fountain codes [11] for content retrieval.
The advantages of coding in caching and storage systems
have been shown in our previous works in [12]–[19]. The
application of fountain codes in distributed storage systems
was also studied in [20]. Other types of erasure codes have
been extensively used in storage systems. Maximum Distance
Separable (MDS) codes are widely used in storage systems
[21], [22] due to their repair capabilities . However, certain re-
quirements are needed to secure the applications that use these
codes. Authors in [23] also studied the security of distributed
storage systems with MDS codes. Pawar et al. [24] studied
the secrecy capacity of MDS codes. The authors in [25],
[26] also proposed security measures for MDS coded storage
systems. Shah et al. [27] proposed information-theoretic secure
regenerating codes for distributed storage systems. Rawat et
al. [28] used Gabidulin codes on top of MDS codes to propose
optimal locally repairable and secure codes for distributed
storage systems. Unlike all of the references [20]–[28], this
paper studies the use of sparse vectors to design codes to
provide security for distributed storage systems. We will show
that these codes can be effectively used to attain asymptotic
perfect secrecy.
Kumar et al. [29] have proposed a construction for re-
pairable and secure fountain codes. Reference [29] achieves
security by concatenating Gabidulin codes with Repairable
Fountain Codes (RFC). Their specific design allows to use
Locally Repairable Fountain Codes (LRFC) for secure repair
of the lost data. Unlike [29] which has focused on the security
of the repair links using concatenated codes, the current paper
provides security for the data storage by only using sparse
vectors without any additional code usage such that perfect
secrecy is achieved.
Network coding schemes has been shown to be very ef-
ficient from a security point of view. Cai and Young [30]
showed that network coding can be used to achieve perfect
secrecy. Bhattad et al. [31] studied the problem of “weakly
secure” network coding schemes in which even without perfect
secrecy, no meaningful information can be extracted from
the network. Subsequent to [31], Kadhe et al. studied the
problem of weakly secure storage systems in [32], [33]. Yan
et al. also proposed [34], [35] algorithms to achieve weak
security and also studied weakly secure data exchange with
generalized Reed Solomon codes. In our method, when using
sparse vectors to design codes for cloud storage systems, the
messages are encoded by combining them with each other
to create the ciphertext. Hence, the ciphertext will not be
independent of the message and the Shannon criteria may not
be valid. Therefore it may be intuitive to think that these codes
can only achieve weak security as opposed to perfect security.
We will show that our unique code construction results in
asymptotic perfect secrecy.
As far as we know, in all previous works in literature,
researchers use existing codes that were originally designed
for error correction and used/modified it for security purposes.
In this paper, we pose the following questions. “Can we design
a code specifically for security of stored data in cloud storage
systems?” More specifically, since we will face the problem of
large quantities of data being generated in the cloud, “can we
design a code that has significantly lower computational com-
plexity for decoding as compared to commonly used encryption
techniques? The immediate benefit from such approach would
be significant reduction on the number of servers needed
to maintain contents securely in the cloud because of the
reduction on the computational complexity associated with
recovering the data. Note that the new code design may not
have any error correcting capabilities. It means that commonly
used codes such as MDS codes [31] can be used to protect
3the data. Another benefit of this approach is that even the
cloud storage provider is unable to access the contents which
provides a level of privacy for users to store their data in
the cloud. Clearly, if the cloud storage provider is unable to
access the contents, any eavesdropper who is listening to the
communication between the user (Alice) and the cloud (Bob),
cannot obtain any useful information.
Our final goal is to demonstrate that perfect secrecy as
defined by Shannon in [1] can be achieved without any need to
store keys. Note that the original approach of Shannon cipher
system [1] is not practical since for each bit of information,
we need to store one bit of key which practically doubles
the storage capacity requirement. We demonstrate that without
generating any key, it is feasible to achieve perfect secrecy
asymptotically. Since in this work we generate equivalent of
key by means of combining of contents together (encoding
function), it is clear that this encoding function cannot be
shared by Alice with the cloud or Eve. This is one fundamental
difference between this work and common problem of wiretap
channel. One can consider this as the private key that is
generated by Alice to secure the contents and won’t be shared
with anyone.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assume that a user wants to store files f1, f2, . . . , fm on a
cloud system where each file has Q bits, i.e. fi ∈ F2Q . We
assume that these are archival data and extension of this work
to non-archival data remains as future work. The m×1 vector
that represents all files is denoted by f = [f1 f2 . . . fm]
T .
A. Encoding
The user encodes these files using an encoding matrix A
of size l×m (where l ≥ m ) and creates1 an encoded vector
of l coded files as b = Af . Assume that the elements of A
belong to the Galois Field F2. The user has a storage space
of size h << l and saves h of these encoded contents locally
and uploads the rest of them on the cloud. These h encoded
contents act similar to the key in traditional cryptography. Let
c be a vector of size (l − h) × 1 showing all the encoded
contents stored on the cloud and u be a vector of size h× 1
representing all the encoded contents saved on the user storage
such that2
b =
[
c
u
]
. (1)
B. File Retrieval
To retrieve a content, we need to solve linear equations in
Galois Field F2. The cloud contains l−h coded files in c and
the user stores h coded files in u locally. When the legitimate
user wants to download any of the contents, the application
that runs by the user should solve the linear equation
Af = b, (2)
1Assume that an encoding peice of software is running on the user which
does all of this processing.
2Note that each row of vector b contains Q bits and for simplicity of
presentation, we use vector representation.
in Galois Field F2 to be able to respond to the download
request by the user. Since l > m, the linear equation in (2)
has many solutions. Let the decoding matrixD be one of these
solutions. This matrix can be split in two smaller matrices Dc
of size m× (l− h) and Du of size m× h denoting the cloud
and user decoding matrices respectively. Therefore, the m× l
decoding matrix D could be used to retrieve the files as
f = Db =
[
Dc Du
] [c
u
]
= Dcc+Duu. (3)
Notice that in equation (3), the first contributing term is
computed on the cloud data and the second contributing term is
calculated from the user stored data. It is important to notice
that cloud only gets the matrix Dc and therefore it is not
capable of decoding the data on its own. In the subsequent
section we will show that the user contributing part Duu acts
similar to the key and is crucial to secure decoding.
C. Low Complexity Secure Code (LCSC) Design
Our goal is to propose an encoding strategy such that A
will be full rank with high probability and the rows of the
matrix A are fairly dense. Further, we want to ideally have a
relatively sparse decoding matrixD. We will use the density of
the encoding matrix A for security purposes and the sparsity
of the decoding matrix D for low complexity decoding. In
other words, we want the columns of the encoding matrix D
to be sparse so that few cloud operations would be enough to
retrieve a content while the rows of the matrix A are dense
such that a relatively large number of files get encoded together
to enhance the security of our system.
From the definition of the decoding matric D we have
DA = Im, (4)
where Im is the m×m identity matrix. If ai is the i
th column
of matrix A, then equation (4) results in the following linear
equation in F2
Dai = ei, (5)
where ei is a vector of all zeros except at the i
th position.
For each column of matrix A, e.g. ai, the Hamming weight
of these vectors define the density of the encoding matrix A.
We will compute the density of A using the Hamming weight
of all vectors ai.
In this paper, we start with a sparse decoding matrix D
and we will show that an encoding matrix A exists such that
the number of 1s in each row of the encoding matrix A is
proportional to Θ(m). To prove this, let’s denote
A = [a1, a2, . . . , am], (6)
where each ai is an l × 1 column vector. We will show that
an encoding matrix A exists such that each ai will have
a Hamming weight of Θ(l). Notice that the vector ai is a
solution to the linear equation in (5) in F2.
Definition 1. A random vector w = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm)
T ∈ Fm2
is called σ-sparse if all of its elements are independent of each
other and we have
P[ωi = 1] =
1
2
(1− σ)
4P[ωi = 0] =
1
2
(1 + σ). (7)
Assume that l independent σ-sparse vectors d1,d2, . . . ,dl
are the columns of the decoding matrix D. In other words, let
D = [d1,d2, . . . ,dl]. (8)
In the next section, we will compute the density of the
encoding matrix A.
IV. EXISTENCE OF A DENSE ENCODING MATRIX
In order to compute the density of the encoding matrix A,
we first prove the following useful lemmas.
Lemma 1. For a vector x ∈ Fl2 with Hamming weight k, we
have
P[Dx = ei | wt(x) = k] = 2
−m
(
1− σk
) (
1 + σk
)m−1
.
(9)
Proof. Since the Hamming weight of x is equal to k, this
means that k vectors from the set of all vectors d1,d2, . . . ,dl
are added together to create ei. Let’s denote these vectors by
de1 ,de2 , . . . ,dek . Let d
ej
i denote the i
th element of vector
dej . Since the vectors de1 ,de2 , . . . ,dek are independent and
their elements are also mutually independent, using binary
summation over F2 we have
P[Dx = ei|wt(x) = k] = P[
k∑
j=1
d
ej
i = 1]
m∏
l′=1
l′ 6=i
P[
k∑
j=1
d
ej
l′ = 0].
(10)
We can easily prove that
P[
k∑
j=1
d
ej
i = 1] =
1
2
(1− σk) (11)
To prove this, we can use induction on k. Equation (7) shows
that it is valid for the base case k = 1. Assume that it is valid
for k − 1. We have
P[
k∑
j=1
d
ej
i = 1] = P[d
ek
i = 1]P[
k−1∑
j=1
d
ej
i = 0]
+ P[deki = 0]P[
k−1∑
j=1
d
ej
i = 1] =
1
2
(1− σ)
1
2
(1 + σk−1)
+
1
2
(1 + σ)
1
2
(1− σk−1) =
1
2
(1− σk) (12)
Similarly, using induction on k and equation (7) we can also
prove that
P[
k∑
j=1
d
ej
l′ = 0] =
1
2
(1 + σk). (13)
Hence, equation (10) can be simplified to
P[Dx = ei | wt(x) = k] = 2
−m
(
1− σk
) (
1 + σk
)m−1
Definition 2. Let F l ⊆ Fl2 be the subset of all vectors in F
l
2
with a Hamming weight of at least l2 .
We will prove that with probability close to one a solution of
equation (5) belongs to F l. To find bounds on the probability
that ei is spanned by d1,d2, . . . ,dl we define a new random
variable Yi and an indicator function 1i(x) as follows
Definition 3. Let Yi denote the number of vectors x ∈ F
l
such that Dx = ei.
Definition 4. Let 1i(x) be an indicator function which is equal
to 1 if Dx = ei and equal to 0 otherwise.
Lemma 2. If D = [d1 d2 . . . dl], then the average number
of vectors x ∈ F l such that Dx = ei is equal to
E[Yi] = 2
−m
l∑
j= l
2
(
l
j
)(
1− σj
) (
1 + σj
)m−1
. (14)
Proof. For every x ∈ F l, we have Yi =
∑
x∈F l 1i(x) and
E[Yi] =
∑
x∈F l P[Dx = ei]. Using the result of Lemma 1 and
taking the summation over all values of k proves the lemma.
Lemma 3. We have, E[Y 2i ] ≤ E[Yi] + E
2[Yi].
Proof. Since Yi =
∑
x∈F l 1i(x) we have
E[Y 2i ] = E

 ∑
x1∈F l
∑
x2∈F l
1i(x1)1i(x2)


=
∑
x1∈F l
∑
x2∈F l
E[1i(x1)1i(x2)] =
∑
x1∈F l
P[Dx1 = ei]
+
∑
x1∈F l
∑
x2∈F
l
x1 6=x2
P[Dx1 = ei]P[Dx2 = ei] = E[Yi]
+ (E[Yi])
2
−
∑
x1∈F l
(P[Dx1 = ei])
2
≤ E[Yi] + E
2[Yi].
Lemma 4. The probability that ei is the summation of at least
k vectors in d1,d2, . . . ,dl is lower bounded by
P[∃x ∈ F l s.t. Dx = ei] ≥
1
1 + 1
E[Yi]
. (15)
Proof. Since Yi is a non-negative integer random variable,
from the second moment method in probability theory we have
P[Yi > 0] ≥
E2[Yi]
E[Y 2i ]
. (16)
Hence, using Lemma 3 we have
P[∃x ∈ F l s.t. Dx = ei] = P[Yi > 0] ≥
E2[Yi]
E[Y 2i ]
≥
1
1 + 1
E[Yi]
Lemma 5. For any 0 < α < 1, we have
1
l + 1
2lH(α) ≤
(
l
αl
)
≤ 2lH(α), (17)
5where H(α) denotes the entropy, i.e., H(α) = −α log2(α)−
(1− α) log2(1 − α).
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix of [36].
Theorem 1. Let the vectors d1,d2, . . . ,dl be σ-sparse ran-
dom vectors belonging to Fm2 such that their average Hamming
weight is asymptotically non-zero, i.e.
lim
m→∞
E[wt(di)] =
1
2
lim
m→∞
m(1− σ) = c1 > 0. (18)
If l = m(1 + ǫ) where ǫ > 0 is an arbitrary constant with
respect to m, then with a probability close to one, at least one
solution of equation (5) belongs to F l for large m.
Proof. Consider a base vector ei for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Using
Lemmas 2 and 5 we have
E[Yi] ≥ 2
−m
(
l
l
2
)
(1− σ
l
2 )(1 + σ
l
2 )m−1
≥
2l−m
l + 1
(1− σ
l
2 )(1 + σ
l
2 )m−1 ≥
2l−m
l + 1
(1− σ
l
2 ).
Since limm→∞ E[wt(di)] = c1 > 0 we have
lim
m→∞
σ
l
2 = lim
m→∞
(
1− 2
c1
m
) 1
2
m(1+ǫ)
= e−c1(1+ǫ)
Hence, for large m we have
E[Yi] ≥ 2
mǫ 1
m(1 + ǫ) + 1
(
1− e−c1(1+ǫ)
)
.
Therefore,
lim
m→∞
1
E[Yi]
≤ lim
m→∞
1
2mǫ 1
m(1+ǫ)+1
(
1− e−c1(1+ǫ)
) = 0
Using Lemma 4 we have
lim
m→∞
P[∃x ∈ F l s.t. Dx = ei] ≥ lim
m→∞
1
1 + 1
E[Yi]
= 1.
This proves that with a probability approaching one, when
m → ∞ and l = m(1 + ǫ) then at least one solution to
equation (5) belongs to F l.
The above argument proves that if l = m(1 + ǫ) for some
ǫ > 0, then at least one of the solutions of the equation (5)
will have a Hamming weight of l2 . Hence, for any σ-sparse
decoding matrix D, at least one encoding matrix A exists
such that all of its columns will have a Hamming weight of
l
2 . Therefore, the average Hamming weight of the rows of
matrix A will be equal to m2 which means that at least one
encoding matrix exists that on average has dense rows.
V. SECURITY
In this section, we will use the results of section IV to
achieve perfect secrecy. Let A be an l × m dense encoding
matrix which has a sparse decoding matrix D. As proved in
section IV, the rows of this matrix will have on average m2 non-
zero elements. Therefore, we can prove the following lemma,
Lemma 6. If the number of non-zero elements of an encoding
vector increases with the number of files m, then the asymp-
totic distribution of bits of the encoded files tend to uniform.
Proof. This proof is given as Lemma 4 in [16].
We will now use equation (3) to analyze the security of
our approach. Let fc = Dcc and fu = Duu denote the
contributions from the cloud and the user for data retrieval.
Then using module two addition we can re-arrange equation
(3) to
fc = f + fu. (19)
Cloud sends fc from the cloud to the user and this informa-
tion is subject to eavesdropping. Equation (19) is similar to
Shannon cipher problem [1]. In Shannon cipher, an encoding
function e : M × K → C is mapping a message M ∈ M
and a key K ∈ K to a codeword C ∈ C. In this problem,
the message f is encoded by the key fu and the ciphertext fc
is created and transmitted through the channel. We want to
examine the criteria for achieving perfect secrecy using the
above cipher. The following theorem provides the necessary
and sufficient condition to obtain perfect secrecy in Shannon
cipher system.
Theorem 2. If |M| = |K| = |C|, a coding scheme achieves
perfect secrecy if and only if
• For each pair (M,C) ∈ (M × C), there exists a unique
key K ∈ K such that C = e(M,K).
• The key K is uniformly distributed in K.
Proof. The proof can be found in section 3.1 of [37].
We will use Theorem 2 to prove that our approach can
achieve asymptotic perfect secrecy.
Theorem 3. If h grows with m such that m < 2h, then
the proposed encoding scheme provides asymptotic perfect
secrecy against any eavesdropper wiretapping the communi-
cation between the cloud and the user.
Proof. We formulated this problem as a Shannon cipher
system assuming that M = f , K = fu, and C = fc. The
condition m < 2h ensures that a unique key exists for each
requested message. Therefore, for any pair (m,C) ∈ (M,C),
a unique key K ∈ K exists such that C = m + K. Further,
we are guaranteed to have |M| = |K| = |C|. Notice that the
key K = fu belongs to the set of all possible bit strings with
Q bits. Lemma 6 proves that each encoded file is uniformly
distributed among all Q-bit strings. Hence each key which
is a unique summation of such encoded files is uniformly
distributed among the set of all Q-bit strings. In other words,
regardless of the distribution of the bits in files, fu can be
any bit string with equal probability for large values of m.
Therefore, the conditions in Theorem 2 are met and perfect
secrecy is achieved.
VI. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATIONS
In this section, we will compare the complexity of our
proposed algorithm with the complexity of AES algorithm
which is the standard cryptographic algorithm adopted by
NIST in the U.S. and is a part of TLS and HTTPS protocols.
AES is a block cipher with a block length of 128 bits.
AES encryption consists of 10 rounds of processing for a
6128-bit key with 128 bit block ciphers. Initially, the key
needs to undergo a KeyExpansion phase in which 10 different
keys are created from the original key. Among many other
operations, the KeyExpansion phase needs at least 50 byte
XOR operations to create new keys. After this phase, the
AES algorithm runs 10 rounds of operations each with a
separate key that is generated in the KeyExpansion phase. Each
round of processing includes one single-byte based substitu-
tion step (SubBytes), a row-wise permutation step (ShiftRows),
a column-wise mixing step (MixColumns), and the addition of
the round key (AddRoundKey). The order in which these four
steps are executed is different for encryption and decryption.
In the AddRoundKey step the input text is XORed with the
key and the same thing happens during decryption. The goal
of ShiftRows and MixColumns steps is to scramble the byte
order inside each 128-bit block. All of these steps require a
lot of operations which result in a large number of sequential
operations either for decoding and encoding. Some of these
operations are summarized in Table I.
Table I compares the number of operations in our proposed
algorithm with the number of operations in the AES algorithm
to justify the significant improvement of our approach over
the AES algorithm in terms of computational complexity.
As can be seen from this table, at least a total of 5268 bit
XOR operations are performed on a 128 block. Therefore, the
number of per-bit XOR operations will be equal to 41.125
bit XOR operations in AES decryption algorithm. Notice that
all of these steps in AES algorithm are done in sequential
order and this will induce significant delays on AES encryption
while out technique requires one-time XOR operation at the
data center.
Sparse decoding in our method allows us to perform the
decoding withm 12 (1−σ) XOR operations. Therefore form =
128, our approach requires 64(1 − σ) XOR operations for
decoding. This table clearly shows that our proposed algorithm
significantly reduces the number of per-bit XOR operations
from 41.125 to 4 XOR operations in case when σ = 15/16. It
also does not require any other operations. Also, our proposed
decoding operation does not inflict significant delay on the
system.
TABLE I
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
Algorithm No. of operations
KeyExpansion step in AES Algorithm 40 byte row shifts
50 byte table look-ups
50 byte XOR operations
AddRoundKey step in AES Algorithm 16 byte XOR operations
SubBytes step in AES Algorithm 16 byte table look-ups
ShiftRows step in AES Algorithm 12 byte row shifts
MixColumns step in AES Algorithm 48 byte XOR operations
64 byte table look-ups
Total number of byte XOR
operations in AES decryption 658 byte XOR operations
Total number of bit XOR
operations in AES decryption 5268 bit XOR operations
Total number of per-bit XOR
operations in AES 41.125 XOR operations
Total number of per-bit XOR
operations in our sparse algorithm
with σ = 15/16 = 0.9375 4 XOR operations
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Fig. 1. Average density of the encoding matrix versus the number of files
for different sparse decoding matrices.
Figure 1 shows our simulation results. In this figure, we
have plotted the average density of the encoding matrix for
different number of files m and different values of sparsity
index σ. The case of σ = 0.5 is equivalent to random uniform
decoding matrices which is not sparse. As we can see form
this plot, when σ = 0.5 the average Hamming weight of
the encoding matrix is equal to m2 for different values of
m. This is intuitively expected due to the symmetry and
non-sparsity of the problem. When σ becomes larger than
0.5, the decoding matrix D becomes sparser which results
in better decoding complexity and lower number of XOR
operations. As can be seen from Figure 1, the average density
of the encoding matrix becomes less than m2 in this case.
However, the simulation results confirm our theoretical results
that regardless of the value of σ, i.e. regardless of the degree
of sparsity of the decoding matrix whenm goes to infinity, the
average Hamming weight of the encoding matrix approaches
the dense value of m2 . Figure 1 shows that for σ = 0.6 and
m > 10, or when σ = 0.7 and m > 40, or when σ = 0.8
and m > 60, then the average density of the encoding matrix
is close to m2 . Further, as can be seen from this plot, when
σ = 0.9 the average density of the encoding matrix slowly
approaches m2 as m goes to infinity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a radically different ap-
proach for providing secure low complexity storage solutions
for cloud systems. Our method is specifically suited for big
data applications when a large number of archival files needs
to be stored on the cloud. We proved that our method is
capable of achieving asymptotic perfect secrecy and through
simulations and numerical studies have shown that it is compu-
tationally more efficient than today’s cryptographic algorithms
which are not well optimized to handle very large number of
files.
We do not claim that this approach can replace encryption
for all applications. For example, the decoding instruction that
is exchanged between the user and cloud can be encrypted first
before transmission. However, this approach can be a good
7alternative for archival data stored in cloud storage systems.
Future work will focus on studying the security properties of
this approach for finite values of m. Extension of this work
to other types of data is also desirable. This work was mainly
focused on decoding properties of these codes but it may be
useful to investigate low encoding complexity secure codes.
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